Using a rich panel of data from New York dairy farms, we construct and estimate a dynamic model of entrepreneurial behavior. Farmers face uninsured risks, borrowing limits and liquidation costs. We allow for occupational choice, renegotiation and retirement. We estimate the model via simulated minimum distance, matching both the production and the …nancial sides of the data. Our model …ts the data well in the aggregate and in the cross section. Policy experiments indicate that …nancial factors play an important role. Farms with high productivity appear to be more constrained than those whose productivity is low. Short-term liquidity constraints inhibit the accumulation of capital and assets. Allowing farms to renegotiate debt allows productive farms to continue operations. Liquidation costs are large, implying that their removal could be socially bene…cial. The non-pecuniary bene…ts of farming appear to be large, and have signi…cant e¤ects on farm behavior.
Introduction
Entrepreneurs have long been recognized as a crucial force in the economy. As exem-pli…ed in Schumpeter's theory of creative destruction, entrepreneurs are considered to be engines of innovation and economic growth. 1 Another strand of the literature on entrepreneurs focuses on their position in the wealth distribution and their role in wealth creation (Quadrini 2000 , Cagetti and De Nardi 2006 . In these studies, entrepreneurs amass wealth because they utilize unique production technologies, and because …nancial frictions lead them to reinvest their income in their own businesses.
The in ‡uence of …nancial constraints is often considered key to understanding entrepreneurial decisions and their implications for investment and growth. 2 In this paper, we formulate and estimate a dynamic structural model of entrepreneurial behavior, using detailed production and …nancial data from a panel of owner-operated New York State dairy farms. We use the model to identify the …nancial constraints facing entrepreneurs, and to quantify their importance for asset accumulation, borrowing, and exit.
Our data are unusually well-suited for this task. They contain information on both real and …nancial activities, including input use, output and revenue, investment, borrowing and equity. 3 The farms in our data face substantial uninsured risk, suggesting that …nancial considerations should be important. Since they are drawn from a single region and industry, they are less vulnerable to issues of unobserved heterogeneity. Our panel spans a decade, which allows us to measure farm-level …xed e¤ects, and sharpens the iden-ti…cation of the model's dynamic mechanisms. We are therefore able to disentangle the e¤ects of real and …nancial factors on the operating decisions of …rms, a classic problem in economics. 4 While structural models of entrepreneurship have been estimated with …rm-level data for developing countries, many using Townsend's Thai data, 5 a lack of small …rm data has hindered the estimation of similar models for developed countries. Our paper …lls this niche. 6 Although the farms in our data are substantial enterprises, with an average of almost 3 million dollars in assets, and use increasingly sophisticated technology (McKinley 2014) , they are almost all run by one or two operators. Our paper is thus a useful complement to the structural corporate …nance literature, which estimates models of corporate behavior that incorporate explicit …nancial constraints (Pratap and Rendon 2003 , Henessey and Whited 2007 , Strebulaev and Whited 2012 . We begin with a description of our data. Using production parameters estimated from our structural model, we construct a measure of total factor productivity, which we decompose into a permanent farm-speci…c component, transitory idiosyncratic shocks, and transitory aggregate shocks. We …nd that high-productivity farms (as measured by the permanent farm-speci…c component) operate at much larger scales, invest more and pay down their debt at faster rates than low productivity farms. We also calculate the static optimal capital stock for a frictionless environment, and …nd that high productivity farms operate further below this optimal scale. This justi…es their higher investment rates and suggests that …nancial constraints may be important in explaining their distance from the optimum. In this respect, our work is similar in spirit to studies assessing the allocation of resources across …rms, such as Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Jeong and Townsend (2007) , Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2011), Midrigan and Xu (2014) .
Our measure of aggregate productivity correlates closely with changes in the price of milk. We …nd that times of higher aggregate productivity are also times of higher investment. Because aggregate productivity appears to be serially uncorrelated, this suggests that cash ‡ow directly a¤ects investment. We …nd that cash ‡ow and investment are indeed positively correlated with each other, controlling for productivity.
We then move to the model. Risk-averse farmers face uninsured risks, borrowing limits arising from limited commitment and liquidation costs, and working capital/liquidity constraints. Older farmers retire, and farmers of any age can exit the industry. A key feature of our …nancial environment is that it allows for the renegotiation of debt. This is consistent with actual practice, which shows that many farms declaring bankruptcy reorganize rather than liquidate (Stam and Dixon, 2004) . Another key feature is that 5 These data are described in Townsend et al. (1997) and Samphantharak and Townsend (2010) . A recent study especially relevant to the project at hand is Karaivanov and Townsend (2014) , which also contains a literature review. 6 To the best of our knowledge, the closest existing study is Buera (2009) , which focuses on the decision to become an entrepreneur rather than the behavior of established businesses. Evans and Jovanovic (1989) also focus on the e¤ects of liquidity constraints on occupational choice. farms must purchase intermediate goods before their productivity shocks are fully realized, exposing them to signi…cant …nancial risk. We estimate the model using a form of simulated minimum distance, matching both the production and the …nancial sides of the data.
Uncovering the deep parameters of the model allows us to perform policy experiments to assess the importance of each constraint. We …nd that these constraints play an important role in determining farm outcomes. Relaxing the short-term borrowing limit on the purchase of variable inputs generates substantial increases in the capital stock, assets and output of the average farm. The ability to renegotiate their debt allows productive farms to continue operating despite temporary setbacks. Finally we …nd the deadweight costs of farm liquidation to be quite large, about 40 percent of total assets. Eliminating these would provide an important social bene…t.
Our model also allows us to quantify the intrinsic utility that farmers derive from farming, in conjunction with a measure of their outside options. A number of studies (e.g., Hamilton, 2000, and Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002) have suggested that non-pecuniary returns are an important factor in entrepreneurial decisions. We …nd that non-pecuniary bene…ts play a signi…cant role in determining exit from farming, especially in their interaction with …nancial constraints. For example, while liquidation costs are not quantitatively important in determining farm dynamics when non-pecuniary bene…ts are present, in the absence of these bene…ts liquidation costs would discourage many low-performing farms from shutting down.
We also …nd that our model can account for several aspects of the cross sectional variation in the data. Regressions on model-simulated data show that high net worth farms appear to allocate their resources more productively, re ‡ecting a greater ability to …nance variable inputs. Farms with high cash ‡ow have larger investment rates, as observed in the data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce our data and perform some diagnostic exercises. In section 3 we construct the model. In section 4 we describe our estimation procedure. In section 5 we present parameter estimates and assess the model's …t. In section 6 we perform a number of numerical exercises, designed to quantify the e¤ects of …nancial constraints. We conclude in section 7.
Data and Descriptive Analysis

The DFBS
The Dairy Farm Business Survey (DFBS) is an annual survey of New York Dairy farms conducted by Cornell University. The data include detailed …nancial records of revenues, expenses, assets and liabilities. Physical measures such as acreage and herd sizes are also collected. Assets are recorded at market as well as book value. These data allow for the construction of income statements, balance sheets, cash ‡ow statements, and a variety of productivity and …nancial measures (Cornell Cooperative Extension, 2006; Karzes et al., 2013).
Our dataset is an extract of the DFBS covering calendar years 2001-2011. This is an unbalanced panel containing 541 distinct farms, with approximately 200 farms surveyed each year. We trim the top and bottom 2.5% of the size distribution; the remaining farms have time-averaged herd sizes ranging between 34 and 1268 cows. Since our model is explicitly dynamic, we also eliminate farms with observations for only one year. Finally we eliminate farms for which there is no information on the age of the operators. Since these are family-operated farms, we would expect retirement considerations to in ‡uence both production and …nance decisions. These …lters leave us with a …nal sample of 338 farms and 2037 observations. Table 1 shows summary statistics. The median farm is operated by two operators and more than 80 percent of the farms have a up to two operators. The average age of the main operator is 51 years. For multi-operator farms, however, the relevant time horizon for investment decisions is the age of the youngest operator, who will likely become the primary operator in the future. On average, the youngest operator tends to be about 8 years younger than the main operator. In our analysis we will consider the age of the youngest operator as the relevant one for age-sensitive decisions. Table 1 also illustrates that these are substantial enterprises: the yearly revenues of the average farm are in the neighborhood of 1.5 million dollars in 2011 terms. The distribution of revenues is heavily skewed to the left, with median farm revenues equal to about half the mean. 7 Real estate is the most intensively leased form of capital. The majority of farms lease less than 20 percent of their machinery and equipment. Livestock is almost always owned. Capital is by far the predominant asset, accounting for more than 80 percent of farm assets. Combining total asssets and liabilities reveals that the average farm has a net worth of 1.4 million dollars. Only 28 (or 1.4 percent ) of all farm-years report negative net worth.
The DFBS reports net investment for each type of capital. It also reports depreciation, allowing us to construct a measure of gross investment. Following the literature, we will focus on investment rates, scaling investment by the market value of owned capital at the beginning of each period. Table 2 describes the distribution of investment rates. Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) show, using data from the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), that plant-level investment often occurs in large increments, suggesting a prominent role for …xed investment costs. Table 2 shows statistics comparable to theirs and, for reference, reproduces the statistics for gross investment rates shown in their Table 1. Relative to the LRD, investment spikes are much less frequent in the DFBS. The average investment rate is also a bit lower, and the inaction rate is slightly higher. These suggest that …xed investment costs are less important in the DFBS, and in the interest of tractibility we omit them from our structural model. 7 We construct leased capital by dividing leasing expenses by the user cost (r + $), where r = 0:04 is the real interest rate, and and ! are depreciation and appreciation rates, respectively. We construct separate user costs for each of three capital types.
Productivity
Our Productivity Measure
One of the strengths of the DFBS data is that it allows us to estimate each farm's productivity. We assume that farms share the following Cobb-Douglas production function
where we denote farm i's gross revenues at time t by Y it and its entrepreneurial input, measured as the time-averaged number of operators by M it . 8 K it denotes the capital stock; N it represents expenditure on all variable inputs, including hired labor and intermediate goods; and z it is a stochastic revenue shifter re ‡ecting both idiosyncratic and systemic factors. 9 With the exception of operator labor, all inputs are measured in dollars. Although this implies that we are treating input prices as …xed, variations in these prices can enter our model through changes in the pro…t shifter z it .
In per capita terms, we have
In this formulation, returns to scale are 1 , with measuring an operator's "span of control" (Lucas, 1978) . Using the structural estimation procedure described below, we estimate b as 0:174 and b = 0:121: This allows us to calculate total factor productivity as
We assume that the resulting TFP measure can be decomposed into an individual …xed e¤ect i ; a time-speci…c component, common to all farms, t , and an idiosyncratic i.i.d component " it :
We …nd that a Hausman test rejects a random e¤ects speci…cation. Regressing z it on farm and time dummies yields estimates of all three components. The …xed e¤ect is dispersed 8 More than two thirds of all farms and 90 percent of farm-years display no change in family size. 9 The assumption of decreasing returns to scale in non-management inputs is not inconsistent with the literature. Tauer and Mishra (2006) …nd slightly decreasing returns in the DFBS. They argue that while many studies …nd that costs decrease with farm size: "Increased size per se does not decrease costs-it is the factors associated with size that decrease costs. Two factors found to be statistically signi…cant are e¢ ciency and utilization of the milking facility." Figure 1 : Aggregate TFP, real Milk Prices, and Cash Flow between 0.42 and 1.55, with a mean of 1.017 and a standard deviation of 0.19. There are therefore signi…cant di¤erences in time invariant productivity across farms. The time e¤ect t is constructed to be zero mean. This series is e¤ectively uncorrelated, 10 and has a standard deviation of 0.061. The idiosyncratic residual " it can also be treated as uncorrelated (the serial correlation is 0.02), with a standard deviation of 0.069.
To provide some insight into this productivity measure, Figure 1 plots the aggregate component t against real milk prices in New York State (New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets, 2012). 11 The aggregate component of TFP follows milk prices very closely -the correlation is well over 90% -which gives us con…dence in our measure. On the same graph we plot the average value of the cash ‡ow (net operating income less estimated taxes) to capital ratio. Aggregate cash ‡ow is also closely related to our aggregate TFP measure. Cash ‡ow varies quite signi…cantly, indicating that farms face signi…cant …nancial risk. i . We divide the sample into high-and low-productivity farms, splitting around the median value of i , and plot the evolution of several variables. To remove scale e¤ects, we either express these variables as ratios, or divide them by the number of operators.
Our convention will be to use thick solid lines to represent high-productivity farms and the thinner dashed lines to represent low-productivity farms. Figure 2 shows output/revenues and input choices. The top two panels of this …gure show that highproductivity farms operate at a scale 4-5 times larger than that of low-productivity farms. This size advantage is increasing over time: high productivity-…rms are growing while lowproductivity …rms are static. The bottom left panel shows that high-productivity farms lease a larger fraction of their capital stock (18 percent vs. 8 percent). The leasing fractions are all small and stable, however, implying that farms expand primarily through investment.
The bottom right panel of Figure 2 shows that the ratio of variable inputs -feed, fertilizer, and hired labor -to capital is also higher for high productivity farms (40% vs. 30%). This is at odds with a simple Cobb-Douglas production function in a frictionless setting. However, …nancial constraints that impede the purchase of variable inputs may lead to higher variable input ratios for high productivity farms, if such farms have better access to funding. To account for this possibility, our model will allow for …nancial constraints on the purchase of inputs. Figure 3 shows …nancial variables. The top two panels contain median cash ‡ow and gross investment. The two variables are positively correlated in the aggregate; for example, the recession of 2009 caused both of these variables to decline. Given that the aggregate shocks are not persistent, the correlation of cash ‡ow and investment suggests …nancial constraints, which will be relaxed in periods of high output prices. The middle left panel shows investment as a fraction of owned capital, and con…rms that high-productivity farms generally invest at higher rates. The middle right panel shows dividends, which are also correlated with cash ‡ow. Dividend ‡ows are in general quite modest, especially for low-productivity farms.
The bottom row of Figure 3 shows two sets of …nancial ratios. The left panel shows debt/asset ratios. 12 Although high-productivity farms begin the sample period with more debt, over the sample period they rapidly decrease their leverage. By 2011, high and low-productivity farms have fairly similar debt/asset ratios. This suggests that the high-TFP …rms are using their pro…ts to de-lever as well as to invest.
In a static frictionless model, the optimal capital stock for a farm with productivity level i is given by k i = [ exp( i )] , where is a positive constant. 13 The bottom right panel of Figure 3 plots median values of the ratio k it =k i , showing the extent to which farms are operating at their e¢ cient scales. The median low-productivity farm is close to the optimal capital stock over the entire sample period. In contrast, the capital stocks of high-productivity farms are well below their optimal size, even as they grow rapidly. This suggests that …nancial constraints are hindering the e¢ cient allocation of capital. Midrigan and Xu (2014) …nd that …nancial constraints impose their greatest distortions by limiting entry and technology adoption. To the extent that high-productivity farms are more likely to utilize new technologies, such as robotic milkers (McKinley, 2014), our 12 To ensure consistency with the model, and in contrast to Table 1 , we add capitalized values of leased capital to both assets and liabilities. 13 This expression can be found by maximizing E(z it )k it n 1 it n it (r + $)k it . In contrast to footnote 7, we use a single user cost for all capital.
Standard calculations show that 
Productivity and Farm Characteristics: Regression Evidence
To further explore what lies behind the variations in the n=k ratio, we construct a measure of distortions following Hsieh and Klenow (2009) . The …rst order conditions of a static optimization problem imply that
where: uc denotes the frictionless user cost of capital, based on a real interest rate of 4% and a depreciation rate (net of capital gains) calibrated from the data; and the price of variable inputs is normalized to 1. Any suboptimal input use (say as a result of a tax on a particular input) will result in a value of ! di¤erent from 1. ! it is therefore a measure of the degree of distortion of input use, which will take values above (below) 1 if the farm uses a higher (lower) n=k ratio than that implied by the …rst order conditions of its optimization problem. Table 3 shows that this measure has a mean of 1.07 and a median of 1.04, implying that the median farm uses a close to optimal proportion of variable inputs, given its capital stock. On the other hand, 50% of farms purchase less than the optimal amount.
In the second panel of the table we consider how deviations from the optimal value of 1 are related to productivity and to …nancial variables. Interestingly, despite controlling for farm and time e¤ects, …nancial variables play an important role in determining the degree to which the input mix is distorted. Asset rich farms have a greater ability to use inputs optimally. Farms with high net worth also use a relatively undistorted mix of inputs. These results suggest that …nancial variables play an important role in the production decisions of the farm. TFP does not have a signi…cant e¤ect, suggesting that the e¤ect of TFP may be in creating better …nancial health for …rms, which in turn allow it to use a closer to optimal input mix.
Next, we reconsider the empirical correlates of investment. In the standard investment regression, investment-capital ratios are regressed against a measure of Tobin's q and a measure of cash ‡ow. While our farms are not publicly traded …rms, and we cannot construct Tobin's q, we can use z it or one of its components as a substitute. Table 4 reports the coe¢ cient estimates. The …rst column of Table 4 shows that …rms with higher values of the TFP …xed e¤ect i have higher investment rates, although the e¤ect is not statistically signi…cant. Investment rates also decline with age, although the coe¢ cient is small. This shows (weak) evidence of life cycle behavior on the part of the farmers. Cash ‡ow is positively and signi…cantly related to investment. . The results change once we introduce …xed e¤ects in the second column. While the coe¢ cient on cash ‡ow is still positive and signi…cant, TFP enters with a negative sign. The negative coe¢ cients on TFP are more di¢ cult to interpret, but the inclusion of time and …xed e¤ects again means that the only independent component of z it is " it . Using gross rather than net investment has little e¤ect. Our results contrast to those of Weersink and Tauer (1989) , who estimate investment models using DFBS data from 1973-1984. Weersink and Tauer …nd that investment levels are decreasing in cash ‡ow and increasing in asset values (which proxy for pro…tability).
Model
Consider a farm family seeking to maximize expected lifetime utility at "age"q: where: q denotes the age of the principal (youngest) operator; d q denotes farm "dividends" per operator; the indicator 1ffarm operatingg equals 1 if the family is operating a farm and 0 otherwise, and measures the psychic/non-pecuniary gains from farming; Q denotes the retirement age of the principal operator; a denotes assets; and E q ( ) denotes expectations conditioned on age-q information. The family discounts future utility with the factor 0 < < 1. Time is measured in years. Consistent with the DFBS data, we assume that the number of family members/operators is constant. We further assume a unitary model, so that we can express the problem on a per-operator basis. To simplify notation, throughout this section we omit "i"subscripts. The ‡ow utility function u( ) and the retirement utility function V Q+1 ( ) are specialized as
with 0, c 0 0, c 1 c 0 and 1. Given our focus on farmers'business decisions, we do not explicitly model the farmers'personal …nances and saving decisions. We instead use the shift parameter c 0 to capture a family's ability to smooth variations in farm earnings through outside income, personal assets, and other mechanisms. The scaling parameter re ‡ects the notion that upon retirement, the family lives for years and consumes the same amount each year.
Before retirement, farmers can either work for wages or operate a farm. While working for wages, the family's budget constraint is
where: a q denotes beginning-of-period …nancial assets; w denotes the age-invariant outside wage; and r denotes the real risk-free interest rate. Workers also face a standard borrowing constraint:
a q+1 0:
Turning to operating farms, recall that gross revenues per operator follow
where k q denotes capital, n q denotes variable inputs, and z qt is a stochastic income shifter re ‡ecting both idiosyncratic and systemic factors. These factors include weather and market prices, and are not fully known until after the farmer has committed to a production plan for the upcoming year. In particular, while the farm knows its permanent TFP component , it makes its production decisions before observing the transitory e¤ects t and " q . A farm that operated in period q 1 begins period q with debt b q and assetsã q . As a matter of notation, we use b q to denote the total amount owed at the beginning of age q: r q is the contractual interest rate used to de ‡ate this quantity when it is chosen at age q 1. Expressing debt in this way simpli…es the dynamic programming problem when interest rates are endogenous. At the beginning of period q, assets are the sum of undepreciated capital, cash, and operating pro…ts:
where: 0 1 is the depreciation rate; $ is the capital gains rate, assumed to be constant; and`q 1 denotes liquid (cash) assets, chosen in the previous period.
A family operating its own farm must decide each period whether to continue the business. The family has three options: continued operation, reorganization, or liquidation. If the family decides to continue operating, it will have two sources of funding: net worth, e q ã q b q ; and the time-q value of new debt, b q+1 =(1 + r q+1 ). (We assume that all debt is one-period.) It can spend these funds in three ways: purchasing capital; issuing dividends, d q ; or maintaining its cash reserves:
Combining the previous two equations yields
Equation (7) shows that investment can be funded through three channels: retained earnings (d q is the dividend paid after y q 1 is realized), contained in the …rst set of brackets; cash reserves, contained in the second set of brackets; and new borrowing, contained in the third set of brackets.
Operating farms also face a liquidity constraint (Jermann and Quadrini, 2012):
with 1. Larger values of imply a more relaxed constraint, with farmers more able to fund operating expenses out of contemporaneous revenues. Because dairy farms provide a steady ‡ow of income throughout the year, in an annual model is likely to exceed 1.
In addition to continued operation, a farm can reorganize or liquidate. If it chooses the second option, reorganization, some of its debt is written down. 14 The debt liability b q is replaced byb q b q and the re-structured farm continues to operate. Finally, if the family decides to exit -the third option -the farm is liquidated and assets net of liquidation costs are handed over to the bank:
We assume that the information/liquidation costs of default are proportional to assets, with 0 1. Liquidation costs are not incurred when the family (head) retires at age Q.
The interest rate realized on debt issued at age q, b r q+1 = b r q+1 (s q+1 ; r q+1 ), depends on the state vector s q+1 (speci…ed below) and the contractual interest rate r q+1 . The function b r( ) emerges from enforceability problems of the sort found in Kehoe and Levine (1993) . If the farmer to chooses to honor the contract, b r q+1 = r q+1 . If the farmer chooses to default,
The return on restructured debt is b
We assume that loans are supplied by a risk-neutral competitive banking sector, so that
where r is the risk free rate. While we allow the family to roll over debt (b q+1 can be bigger thanã q+1 ), Ponzi games are ruled out by requiring all debts to be resolved at retirement:
To understand the decision to default or renegotiate, the family's problem needs to be expressed recursively. To simplify matters, we assume that the decision to work for wages is permanent, so that the Bellman equation for a worker is:
s:t: equation (3):
The Bellman equation for a family who has decided to fully repay its debt and continue farming is where V q+1 ( ) is the continuation value prior to the time-q + 1 occupational choice:
We require that the renegotiated debt levelb q+1 is incentive-compatible:
The …rst line of the de…nition ensures thatb q+1 is incentive-compatible for lenders: the bank can always force the farm into liquidation, boundingb from below at (1 )ã q+1 : However, if the family …nds liquidation su¢ ciently unpleasant, the bank may be able to extract a payment, b q+1 , that is larger. The second line ensures that such a payment is incentive-compatible for farmers, i.e., farmers must be no worse o¤ under this deal than they would be if they liquidated and switched to wage work.
A key feature of this renegotiation is limited liability. If the farm liquidates, the bank at most receives (1 )ã q+1 , and under renegotiation dividends are bounded below by c 0 . Our estimated value of c 0 is small, implying that new equity is expensive and not an important source of funding.
The debt contract also bounds repayment from above: the farm can always honor its contract and pay back b q+1 . Solving forb q+1 allows us to express the …nance/occupation indicator I B q 2 fcontinue, restructure, liquidateg as the function I B q (s q ). It immediately follows that
Inserting this result into equation (9), we can calculate the equilibrium contractual rate as 15 15 The previous equation shows that the ratio 1+b rq(sq;rq) 1+rq
is independent of the contractual rate r q . Finding r q thus requires us to calculate the expected repayment rates only once, rather than at each potential value of r q , as would be the case if time-t debt were denominated in time-t terms. (In the latter case, b q+1 would be replaced with (1 + r q )b q .) This is a signi…cant computational advantage.
Econometric Strategy
We estimate our model using a form of Simulated Minimum Distance (SMD). In brief, this involves comparing summary statistics from the DFBS to summary statistics calculated from model simulations. The parameter values that yield the "best match" between the DFBS and the model-generated summary statistics are our estimates.
Our estimation proceeds in two steps. Following a number of papers (e.g., French, 2005 ; De Nardi, French and Jones, 2010), we …rst calibrate or estimate some parameters outside of the model. In our case there are four parameters. We set the real rate of return r to 0.04, a standard value. We set the outside wage w to an annual value of $25,000, or 2,000 hours at $12.50 an hour. To a large extent, the choice of w is a normalization of the occupation utility parameter , as the parameters a¤ect occupational choice the same way. Using DFBS data, we set the capital depreciation rate to 5.56% and the appreciation rate $ to 3.59%. 16 In the second step, we estimate the parameter vector = ( , , c 0 , , c 1 , , , , n 0 , , ) using the SMD procedure itself. To construct our estimation targets, we sort farms along two dimensions, age and size. There are two age groups: farms where the youngest operator was 39 or younger in 2001; and farms where the youngest operator was 40 or older. This splits the sample roughly in half. We measure size as the time-averaged herd size divided by the time-averaged number of operators. Here too, we split the sample in half: the dividing point is between 86 and 87 cows per operator. As Section 2 suggests, this measure corresponds closely to the …xed TFP component i . Then for each of these four age-size cells, for each of the years 2001 to 2011, we match:
1. The median value of capital per operator, k.
2. The median value of the outputto-capital ratio, y=k.
3. The median value of the variable input-to-capital ratio, n=k.
4.
The median value of the gross investment-to-capital ratio.
5.
The median value of the debt-to-asset ratio, b=ã 6. The median value of the cash-to-asset ratio,`=ã. 7. The median value of the dividend growth rate, d t =d t 1 . 17 For each value of the parameter vector , we …nd the SMD criterion as follows. First, we use and to compute z it for each farm-year observation in the DFBS, following equation (1) . We then decompose z it according to equation (2) . This yields a set of …xed e¤ects f i g i and a set of aggregate shocks f t g t to be used in the model simulations, and allows us to estimate the means and standard deviations of i , t , and " iq for use in …nding the model's decision rules. Using a bootstrap method, we take repeated draws from the joint distribution of s i0 = ( i ; a i0 ; b i0 ; q i0 ; t i0 ), where a i0 , b i0 and q i0 denote the assets, debt and age of farm i when it is …rst observed in the DFBS, and t i0 is the year it is …rst observed. At the same time we draw # i , the complete set of dates that farm i is observed in the DFBS.
Discretizing the asset, debt, equity and productivity grids, we use numerical methods to …nd the farms' decision rules. We then compute histories for a large number of arti…cial farms. Each simulated farm j is given a draw of s j0 and the shock histories f t ; " jt g t . The residual shocks f" jt g jt are produced with a random number generator, using the standard deviation of " iq described immediately above. The aggregate shocks we use are those observed in the DFBS. Combining these shocks with the decision rules allows us to compute that farm's history. We then construct summary statistics for the arti…cial data in the same way we compute them for the DFBS. Let g mt , m 2 f1; 2; :::; M g, t 2 f1; 2; :::; T g, denote a summary statistic of type m in calendar year t, such as median capital for young, large farms in 2007. The model-predicted value of g mt is g mt ( ). Our SMD criterion function is
Because the model gives farmers the option to become workers, we also need to match some measure of occupational choice. We do not attempt to match observed attrition, because the DFBS does not report reasons for non-participation, and a number of farms exit and re-enter the dataset. In fact, when data for a particular farm-year are missing in the DFBS, we treat them as missing in the simulations, using our draws of # i . However, we also record the fraction of farms that exit in our simulations but not in the data. We use this fraction to calculate a penalty that is added to the SMD criterion. 18 Our estimate of the "true"parameter vector 0 is the value of that minimizes this modi…ed criterion. Appendix ?? contains a detailed description of how we calculate standard errors.
5 Parameter Estimates and Identi…cation 5.1 Parameter Estimates and Goodness of Fit Table 5 displays the parameter estimates. We are still in the process of getting standard errors. While the estimated value of the discount factor , 0.986, is fairly standard, the risk aversion coe¢ cient is only 0.24. This may re ‡ect the ability of farmers to smooth consumption with their personal assets. The retirement parameters imply that farms value post-retirement consumption; in the period before retirement, farmers consume only 7.9% of their wealth, saving the rest. 19 The non-pecuniary bene…t of farming, , is expressed as a consumption increment to the non-farm wage w. With w equal to $25,000, the estimates imply that the psychic bene…t from farming is equivalent to the utility gained by increasing consumption from $25,000 to $73,900. Even if the outside wage is low, the income from low productivity farms is so small that their operators would exit if they did not receive a signi…cant psychic bene…t.
The returns to management and capital are both fairly small, implying that the returns to intermediate goods, 1 , are in excess of 70 percent. Table 1 shows that variable inputs in fact equal about 77:5% of revenues. The liquidation loss, , is about 40 percent. This is at the upper range of the estimates found by Levin, Natalucci and Zakrajšek (2004) , who note that many papers calibrate the loss to be between 10 and 20 percent. Given that a signi…cant portion of farm assets are site-speci…c, higher loss rates are not implausible. The liquidity constraint parameter is estimated to be about 2.3, implying that farms need to hold liquid assets equal to about 5 months of expenditures. Figures 4 and 5 the senior cohort has an average age of 48. As before, thick lines denote large farms, and thin lines denote smaller farms. For the most part the model …ts the data fairly well.
The model understates the spending on variable inputs by large farms, and overstates the extent to which they reduce their debt. However, the model captures many of the di¤erences between large and small farms, and much of the year-to-year variation.
Identi…cation
The model's parameters are identi…ed from aggregate averages. Some linkages are straightforward. For example, the production coe¢ cients and are identi…ed by expenditure shares, and the extent to which farm size varies with productivity. The cash constraint is identi…ed by the observed cash/asset ratio.
The identi…cation of the preference parameters is less straightforward. Table 6 shows comparative statics for our model, which we …nd by repeatedly simulating the model while changing parameters in isolation. The numbers in the table are averages of the model-simulated data over the 11-year (pseudo-) sample period.
Row (1) shows data for the baseline model, associated with the parameters in Table  5 . Row (2) shows the averages that arise when the discount factor is reduced to 0:975. Lowering leads farms to hold less capital and invest less, as they place less weight on future returns. On the other hand, farms purchase relatively more variable inputs: the N=K ratio rises from 0.305 to 0.319. 20 While farms can fund some of their variable inputs out of revenues, capital must be fully funded. Because lowering raises the relative cost (3) and (4) show the e¤ects of changing the risk coe¢ cient . When = 0, farmers are risk-netural. This leads them to hold less debt, as the borrowing rate r = 0:04 exceeds the discount rate. Risk-neutrality also leads farmers to invest more aggressively in capital, as they are less concerned about its stochastic returns. In contrast, increasing to 0:5 (row (4)) results in farmers holding more debt. The underlying simulations show that this debt is used to fund larger dividends in early years; because farmers have stronger dividend smoothing motives, they desire ‡atter dividend pro…les. The utility shifter c 0 is identi…ed by similar mechanics.
The retirement parameters c 1 and are identi…ed by life cycle variation not shown in Table 6 . As goes to zero, so that retirement utility vanishes, older farmers will have less incentive to invest in capital, and their capital holdings will fall relative to those of younger farmers.
The parameters and are both identi…ed by occupational choice, namely the estimation requirement that all farms observed in the DFBS in a given year also be operating and thus observed in the simulations. Row (5) shows the e¤ect of setting the occupational utility term to zero. Eliminating the psychic bene…ts of farming leads many farms to liquidate; the fraction of farms operating (and observed in the DFBS) drops from 55% to 49%. Not surprisingly, it is the smaller, low productivity farms that exit: the surviving farms in row (5) have more assets, debt and capital. Hamilton (2000) and Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) …nd that many entrepreneurs earn below-market returns, suggesting that non-pecuniary bene…ts are large. (Also see Quadrini, 2009.) Figure 3 shows that many low-productivity farms have dividend ‡ows smaller than the outside salary of $25,000. This is consistent with a high value of .
Row (6) shows the e¤ects of setting the liquidation cost to zero. Eliminating the liquidation cost reduces the number of operating farms, by allowing farmers to retain more of their wealth upon exiting. 21 While the e¤ect of setting to zero in isolation is small, row (7) shows that in the absence of psychic bene…ts, eliminating liquidation costs encourages many more farms to exit. Liquidation costs thus provide another explanation of why entrepreneurs may persist in professions with low …nancial returns. We will discuss the e¤ects of and other …nancial constraints in greater detail in the next section.
The E¤ects of Financial Constraints
Our model contains four important …nancial elements: liquidation costs, limits on new equity, the ability to renegotiate debt, and liquidity constraints. In this section, we consider the e¤ect of each of these elements on assets, debt, capital and investment.
Liquidation Costs
Row (6) of Table 6 shows that eliminating liquidation costs ( ) in isolation has very little e¤ect. The non-pecuniary bene…ts of farming discourage almost all farms from exiting, and they encourage prudent …nancial behavior. If there are no non-pecuniary bene…ts ( = 0), on the other hand, eliminating liquidation costs leads many more farms to exit. Rows (6) and (7) show that the fraction of operating farms drops from 49 to 40 percent. The remaining farms are signi…cantly larger and more productive. Liquidation costs thus lead to …nancial ine¢ ciency, by discouraging the reallocation of capital and labor to more productive uses.
Eliminating liquidation costs also encourages more lending, as lenders can appropriate larger amounts from farms in the event of default. Row (7) does indeed show higher levels of indebtedness. This increase, however, also re ‡ects compositional changes.
Equity Injections
In addition to serving as a preference parameter, c 0 limits the ability of farms to raise funds from equity injections. Row (8) shows the e¤ects of increasing c 0 to 2,000, allowing farmers to inject up to $2 million of personal funds into their farms each year. Because farmers have a discount rate of 1:4 percent, as opposed to the risk-free rate of 4 percent, they greatly prefer internal funding over debt. Increasing c 0 to 2,000 thus results in a dramatic decrease in debt, along with as signi…cant increases in capital and assets. The reduced cost of funds also leads to a di¤erent input mix. Because capital becomes cheaper relative to intermediate goods, the N=K ratio falls from 30.4 to 23.5 percent. 22 Limits on new equity play an important role in our model.
Liquidity Constraints
Rows (9) and (10) illustrate the e¤ects of the liquidity constraint given by equation (8). Row (9) of Table 6 shows what happens when we tighten this constraint by reducing to 1. While total assets and debt both modestly increase, the cash to asset ratio increases by 85 percent, from 12 to 17 percent. Rather than holding their assets in the form of capital, farms are obliged to hold it in the form of liquid assets used to purchase intermediate goods. This has important consequences for output, assets and capital. The average capital stock falls by 6.7 percent, from 1,547 to 1,443, as more funds are diverted to cash. Purchases of intermediate goods also fall. Output falls by 7.8 percent.
Loosening the liquidity constraint ( = 4) allows farms to hold a larger fraction of their assets in productive capital, raising the assets' overall return. Farms respond by borrowing more and purchasing more capital. The average debt level increases by about 3 percent, while the capital stock increases by about 7 percent. Total assets increase by 2 percent, leading to higher debt to asset ratios. The intermediate goods to capital ratio remains almost the same, suggesting that the purchase of intermediate goods also increase substantially. Output is consequently 5.7 per cent higher than in the baseline case. Relaxing the liquidity constraint has signi…cant real e¤ects.
Renegotiation of Debt Contracts
Finally we explore the role of contract renegotiation in our model. Row (11) of Table 6 shows the e¤ects of eliminating renegotiation and requiring farms with negative net worth (12) illustrates the combined e¤ects of eliminating renegotiation and setting = 0: The number of operating farms falls signi…cantly, by about 22 percent. The exiting farms de…ntely come from the lower tail of the productivity distribution, as the surviving farms on average have about 19 percent more capital and assets. Insolvent low-productivity farms are far more willing to roll over their debt when farming provides psychic bene…ts.
Cross-sectional Evidence
While the comparative statics presented above give a good picture of the behavior of the average farm, it is also interesting to also study the cross sectional variation. Another way to assess the importance of the model's …nancial mechanisms to repeat the regressions in Tables 3 and 4 on simulated data. Such an exercise also provides useful out-of-sample validation. The results are presented in Tables 7 and 8 respectively. Table 7 shows that the model-generated data displays behavior very similar to the actual data. Firms with higher assets or net worth still come closer to reaching their optimal input mix, through better access to funding. Table 8 shows that our model also generates a positive relation between cash ‡ow and investment, even after controlling for productivity. Larger cash ‡ow (de…ned as the di¤erence between revenue and input 
Overview
To sum up: our estimates and policy exeriments suggest that …nancial factors play an important role in farm outcomes. Our model is rich enough to distinguish between many types of constraints and quantify their importance. The liquidity constraint on variable inputs seems to be the constraint with the maximum impact, in the sense that relaxing it can increase assets, capital and output of farms substantially. Similar borrowing constraints have been shown to play an important role in …nancial crises in Latin America and East Asia (see for example Pratap and Urrutia 2012, Mendoza 2010). There is also evidence that the ability to renegotiate debt allows productive farms to remain operational.
Although, the costs associated with liquidation seem important in terms of the social waste they engender (40 percent of assets), removing them does not seem to alter farm outcomes substantially. This is because of the non-pecuniary bene…ts of farming. Because low productivity farms generate very small income streams, the model can rationalize their operation only by assigning a large psychic bene…t to farming. The intrinsic utility of farming, however, leads farms to avoid liquidation, regardless of its costs. In the absence of this bene…t, however, liquidation costs have signi…cant e¤ects, as they discourage lowproductivity farms from exiting. In our model, this reallocation e¤ect of liquidation costs appears at least as signi…cant as any borrowing restrictions.
Conclusion
Using a rich panel of New York State dairy farms, we estimate a structural model of farm investment, liquidity and production decisions. Farms face uninsured idiosyncratic and aggregate risks, as well as cash- ‡ow constraints on variable expenditures. They enter into debt contracts that account for liquidation costs and allow for renegotiation. Farmers choose their occupation, and can exit farming through retirement as well as liquidation. Using a simulated minimum distance estimator, we …nd that our model can account for several aspects of the time series and cross sectional variation in the data.
Our model allows us to quantify the importance of each type of …nancial constraint. We …nd that the short-term borrowing constraint on the purchase of variable inputs exerts a strong in ‡uence on investment, asset accumulation and liquidity management decisions of farms. The renegotiability of the debt contract allows productive farms to remain operational when they experience transitory setbacks. Liquidation costs are large, suggesting that their removal could be socially bene…cial. As in the data, our model also predicts that …nancial health is important for farm investment and its ability to use inputs optimally.
We …nd that high-productivity farms are further below their optimal scale than lowproductivity farms, suggesting a signi…cant misallcoation of resources. On the other hand, our estimates indicate that the non-pecuniary bene…ts of farming are an important force in keeping many farms operational. Removing them (or equivalently, improving outside opportunities for farmers) would lead to a signi…cant exit of farms in the lower tail of the productivity distribution. Because they discourage exit, the psychic bene…ts also play an important role in the structure of the debt contract. In the absence of psychic bene…ts, liquidation costs also discourage exit, suggesting that they too could hinder the reallocation of capital.
